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in the courts of this country. A more thorough examination of the
law as actually administered, and a comparison of it with the ancient rules, would serve to show that all the changes -which have
been successively adopted have been made only with the view of
preserving and effectuating the actual and just intentions and objects of the parties to the contract, which obvious and most desirable end is, under the present system, more fully attained than at
any time heretofore.
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THE UNITED STATES VS. HORATIO X. GOULD.
THE UNITED STATES VS. T. V. BRODNAX.
1. Congress has the Constitutional power to prohibit the foreign slave trade.
2. That power is part of the power to regulate foreign commerce. It is commercial
in its character, and has the same extent and application, and the same limits,
as the power to regulate foreign commerce.
3. The several States have the general sovereign right, to determine who may or who
may not live within their limits, to fix the political and social status of each
inhabitant, and to prescribe his rights and punish their violation within its limits.
4. This portion of State sovereignty has not been wholly surrendered to the General
Government. It is surrefidered only to the extent and for the purposes specified
by the Constitution. As respects negroes, imported as slaves, it is surrendered
only so far as to allow the prohibition of such importation, and as a means to this,
the removal of negroes unlawfully imported. The power to prescribe and to protect the rights of such negroes, after the importation is entirely complete and
ended, and they have become mingled with the mass of the population of a State,
is exclusively in the State Government.
5. It is settled, by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, that the commercial
power of the General Government extends to and covers (exclusively of the interference of State laws,) the. importation of either goods or persons, until the commercial transaction of importation is complete and ended, and no further. When
the goods or persons imported pass out of the possession or control of the importer, his agents and employees, and become mingled with the mass of property or
population of a State, they then become subject to the State jurisdiction and laws.
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6. The laws (f the United States prohibiting the foreign slave trade, are to be construel in reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and to the nature,
extent and limits of the Constitutional power of Congress over this subject.
7. The sole mischief intended to be remedied was the importation of negroes as
slaves. It was not and is not, the manner in which either free negroes or slaves
are regarded or treated in any State.
8. These laws extend to all persons who in any manner, directly or indirectly, participate, aid or abet, in the prohibited importation. They do not extend to
offences committed in a State against the rights of a negro who had been previously unlawfully imported by some other person, after he has passed out of the
possession or control of the importer and become mingled with the mass of the
population of a State.
9. An indictment which only charges that the accused, within this State, did hold,
sell, or otherwise dispose of, a negro or a slave, who had previously been unlawfully imported by some other persons, without alleging that the accused did participate, aid or abet, in the unlawful importation, is fatally defective.
10. The mode of procedure prescribed by the 7th section of the act of April, 20,1818,
for enforcing the penalty for violating its provisions, is a qui-tam action, and no
other. Therefore an indictment does not lie under that section.

Thie -District Attorney (A. J. Requier, Esq.,) for the United
States.
George N. Stewart, Wn. Boyles and Bobert B. Armstead, for
the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Mr. Gould is indicted under the 7th section of the Act
of Congress of April 20, 1818, prohibiting the foreign slave trade.
There are three counts in the indictment. The first count charges,
" that Horatio N. Gould, late of said district, heretofore, to wit, on
the first -day of March, A. D. eighteen hundred and fifty-nine, at
Mobile county, to wit, in the district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, a certain number, to wit, one female negro,
whose name is to these jurors unknown, and who had, then and there,
been lately unlawfully brought into the jurisdiction of the said
United States, to wit, on the twentieth day of February, A. D.
eighteen hundred and fifty-nine, at the county and district and within
the jurisdiction aforesaid, in a manner and from a foreign place to
these jurors unknown, by a certain number, to wit, one person, whose
JONES,
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name is to these jurors unknown, did, then and there, to wit, at the
time and place aforesaid, with force and arms, unlawfully and knowingly hold the said negro, so then and there unlawfully brought in
as aforesaid, as a slave, for a certain time, to wit, for three days,
contrary to the power of the statute in such cases made and
provided," &c. The second and third counts are substantially
like the first, except that the second count charges, that Gould did
"sell" (instead of "hold" ;) and the third count charges that he did
"dispose, otherwise than by selling her, of said negro," &c.
The accused has demurred to each count in the indictment. This
presents for decision the question whether this indictment charges
in a legal and sufficient manner, an indictable offence against the laws
of the United States. The objections urged against the indictment
are 1st; That it is too vague and uncertain, in this, that it does not
state the name of the negro, or any description of her, except that
it is a female, nor the names or description of a foreign place from
which, or persons by whom, she is alleged to have been unlawfully
brought in; 2d. That it does not show that Gould had any participation whatever in the importation of the negro; and that the law
applies only to the importers, their agents or employees; 3d. That
if the law was intended to apply to other persons than the importers,
their agents or employees, it is to that extent unconstitutional.
Passing over the supposed want of sufficient certainty, in the
description of the offence charged, I shall proceed at once to the
more important question raised by the demurrer. It is conceded by
the District Attorney of the United States, that the indictment is
under the 7th, and not the 6th section of the act of 20th April, 1818,
and that he does not charge, and does not expect to prove, that Mur.
Gould in any manner participated in, or had any knowledge of the
illegal importation. The charge then, when stripped of the legal
phraseology of the indictment, is simply this, that Mr. Gould, without any participation in the illegal importation, did, within this district, hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of, as a slave, a negro who had
been previously unlawfully imported by some other person. The
material question is, whether this is, or is not, an indictable offence
against the laws of the United States.

THE UNITED STATES vs. GOULD.

case has been referred to in the argument, nor have I been
able to find any case, in which this question has been decided by any
court. It is a novel question, and recent events have rendered it
one of much interest and importance. It has been the settled policy
of our country, for more than fifty years, to prohibit, under severe
penalties, the importation of slaves. The laws enacted to carry out
this policy had the support and approval of the statesmen and
people of all sections of our country. Within the last three or four
years a few perso'ns in the South have questioned the constitutional
power of Congress to pass these laws. Some others, admitting the
power, have denied the policy of these laws, and earnestly urged
their repeal. There have no doubt been some recent violations of
these laws. The whole subject has been much discussed, and most
men must have formed some opinion upon it. For my own part I
have examined the subject very carefully. The result of that examination is a thorough and clear conviction, that Congresshas the constitutionalpower to prohibitthe importationof slaves; that it is wise,
just and politic to prohibit it, and that the laws prohibiting it ought
not to be repealed,but ought to be maintained,respected, and strictly
enforced.
As there are several similar cases pending in this court for the
middle district of Alabama, and this is the first which has been
brought before me for decision, I think it due to the importance of
the question, and to the parties interested in it, that the reason and
extent of my decision should be stated as clearly as possible. This
is the more proper, because, (much to my regret,) there is no appeal
in such cases to any higher tribunal. Knowing that if I commit an
error in deciding this question, it cannot be corrected, I have examined it carefully, and reflected on it maturely. If my opinion is
erroneous, it is an error of judgment alone.
The proper determination of this question necessarily requires an
examination of the nature and extent of the constitutional power of
Congress over this subject, and a construction of the Acts of Congress upon it. In construing both the constitution and statutes, the
great object is to ascertain what was the true meaning and intention
of those who framed them. The words of a statute are the princiNo
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pal, but not the only means of determining the meaning and intention of the legislature. There are many well settled rules and principles of construction of statutes resorted to by the courts to aid in
arriving at the true intention. Two of the rules of construction I
shall state and use in this case. The first is to consider the mischief
intended to be remedied. The second is, never to give a statute
such a construction as would render it unconstitutional, if it will
possibly admit of any other construction which would make it consistent with the constitution. We will first inquire: What was the
mischief intended to be remedied by the convention which framed
the constitution, and by Congress in passing this law? It is well
known from the debates of the convention, and the cotemporaneous
history of the times; that the framers of the constitution considered
the foreign slave trade as a great evil, which ought to be suppressed.
That was the mischief which had been the subject of complaint, and
which they designed to remedy. Nobody had complained of the
manner in which free negroes were regarded and treated, in any of
the States. That was never thought of by the convention. The
same remark is equally applicable to Congress, which passed these
laws. The mischief which both the convention and Congress intended to remedy, was, unquestionably, the foreign slave trade, and
nothing else. This proposition I think too clear to admit of dispute,
but as I considered it very important, I will refer to two instances,
to show, not only that it has been recognized, but how it has been
practically applied by the executive branch of our government, in
the construction and execution of these laws. I refer to two official
opinions given by Mr. Wirt, as Attorney-General. They are not
indeed binding authorities on the courts, but from his known ability
as a lawyer, his official opinions, adopted and acted on by the government, are certainly entitled to much respect. The first section
of the act of 20th April, 1818, provides that "it shall not be lawful
to import or bring, in any manner whatever, into the United States
from any foreign place, &c., any negro, &c., with intent to hold,
&c., any such negro, &c., as a slave, or to be held to service or labor;
and any ship, &c., employed in any importation as aforesaid, shall
be liable to seizure, &c." In 1821 a Mr. McFarlane, brought into
34
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New York, from the Island of Tobago, (a foreign place) on theschooner
Sally, a negro boy, who was free in Tobago. The negro boy came
voluntarily, and with the con~ent of his mother, as the servant of
Mr. Mcarlane. This was done with the knowledge of the captain
of the schooner. The collector of the port of New York considered
this a violation of the law, and seized the schooner. The case was
reported to the Secretary of the Treasury, who referred it to Mr.
Wirt, as Attorney-General, for his opinion. It is manifest that the
case came within the letter of the law. A negro was brought into the
United States from a foreign place with intent to hold him to service
or labor. It is equally clear that the case did not come within the
mischief which the law was made to remedy; Mr. Wirt gave it as
his opinion that this was not a violation of the law. 5 Opinions of
Att'y-Gen., 736.
Soon afterwards a somewhat similar case was referred by the
President to the Attorney-General. The wife and children of Mr.
Fayoll, of Charleston, embarked for France in 1820, taking with
them as a servant a negro girl slave, belonging to Mr. Fayoll, intending to return in 1822. Mr. Fayoll wished the negro to return to
the United States with his family. The question submitted was,
whether this would be a violation of the law. It was a case where a
negro would be brought into the United States from a foreign country, with intent to hold the negro as a slave. It was clearly within
the letter of the law, and Mr. Wirt seems to have been conscious of
this. He says, however, "I am of opinion that the case is not
within the meaning of the law; that the legislature were not looking
to the case of persons going abroad on a visit, or to sojourn for a
short time, and taking a servant with them from the United States,
which they were desirous of bringing back with them; that this was
not at all the mischief which Congress had in view ; that they meant
not to prohibit the return of a body servant with his master or mistress, but an original importation or bringing in to increase the
stock of slaves in the United States." And he accordingly gave it
as his opinion that the negro might be brought back without the
violation of any law of the United States. 1. Opinions of Attorney-General, 503. This opinion of Mr. Wirt was afterwards fully
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sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case of the United States vs. Skiddy, 11 Peters, 73, in which
the precise point was presented, and decided in accordance with Mr.
Wirt's opinion. See also to the same point Newberry's Reports,
409. In construing the constitution and statutes, on this subject
we will be greatly aided by constantly bearing in mind that the
foreign slave trade was the sole mischief which was intended to
be remedied.
There are other principles of construction applicable to the constitution, which are now so well settled that they may properly be
called political and legal maxims. The general government is a
special and limited government. It has no other soverign powers
than those conferred upon it by the constitution. On the contrary,
the several States are original sovereignties. Each State has all
the rights and powers, usually appertaining to a sovereign State,
except such as it has, by the constitution, conferred upon the general
government. Among the rights and powers usually appertaining to
every sovereign State, are, the power to determine who may or may
not come into its territories from other countries, to fix and determine
the social and political relations, in which all its inhabitants shall
stand to each other, or in other words, the social and political status
of every inhabitant ; to determine the personal rights of every one
within its borders, and to protect those rights and punish their violation. These principles are asserted and established by the Supreme
Court in the case of the City of New York vs. liln, 11 Peters, 102.
That the States have entirely surrendered all these sovereign powers
to the general government has never been contended by the most
latitudinarian construers of the constitution. Let us inquire to what
extent these powers have been surrendered to the general government, so far as they apply to the slave trade.
It is well known that the regulation of foreign commerce was
one of the principal inducements for the formation and adoption of
the Constitution. The African slave trade was then, and had long
been an extensive and lawful branch of the foreign commerce of our
country. Some of the States at that time permitted and some had
prohibited the importation of slaves. The question, whether the
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power to conotrl or prohibit that trade should be given to the general government or not, was one of much difficulty, and was maturely
considered by the convention. The result was, that by the constitution
the power "to regulate commerce with foreign wations," was given
to Congress in general and comprehensive terms. But in respect
to the foreign slave trade, a special and particular provision was
inserted in these wordsSEc. ix. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person."

It is very plain, that the object and effect of this special clause
are to define and limit the previous general grant of power over
foreign commerce. The definition is, that Congress, as to this particular branch of foreign commerce, shall have power to prohibit it;
and the limitations are, that this prohibitory power shall not be
exercised prior to the year 1808, and the duty imposed shall not
exceed ten dollars for each person. The language of the constitution seems to me too clear to admit of a reasonable doubt, or to
If such
require reasoning or authorities to shoiv its meaning.
of the
history
contemporaneous
whole
the
needed,
were
authorities
country, the reported proceedings and debates of the convention
and of the State conventions which adopted the constitution, and
of the subsequent action of every department of the government
from that time to this, all concur in showing that such was the true
intent and meaning of that part of the constitution. I have no
doubt or hesitation, therefore, in holding that Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit the foreign slave trade,and to pass all
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution that power. I
think it equally clear, from the nature of the subject, and the manner in which it is introduced and expressed in the constitution, that
this power is part of the power conferred upon Congress over
foreign commerce. It was so considered in the debates of Congress
on the Act of 1807, and by the Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1, and in the Passenger cases, 7
Howard, 283. See also 2 Story on the Constitution, § 1337.
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In its nature, then, this power is commercial in its character.
Having now ascertained what was the mischief intended to be remedied-that is, the foreign slave trade-and the nature of the
power conferred upon Congress on this subject-that is, that it is
part of the commercialpower-we will next proceed to enquire into
the extent and limit of this power. In doing so I shall endeavor
to follow what seem to me the clearest and safest precedents,
afforded by our political and judicial records.
The first precedent to which I shall refer is, the old Alien law
passed in 1798, during the federal administration of the elder
Adams. That law authorized the President, under certain circumstances, to remove aliens out of the country. It was strongly denounced by Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and all the statesmen of
the State rights school of that day, as unconstitutional-a palpable
usurpation of power by the general government-and a dangerous
encroachment on the rights of the States. Why was it considered
unconstitutional ? Obviously, because it was an original inherent
sovereign right of each State to determine who might or who might
not live within its limits, and that power had not been surrendered
to the general government. An alien in a State was under the
jurisdiction, control and protection of that State. It was for the
State to determine whether he might or might not remain within
its limits, to prescribe his rights, and punish any violation of them.
The Alien law was an infringement on these rights of the States,
and therefore unconstitutional. It is true, that the unconstitutionality of that law was never passed upon judicially by any court, so
far as I can find ; but it was most effectually passed upon by the
people in the presidential election of 1800. They passed upon its
authors a most righteous judgment of condemnation. Nearly sixty
years have elapsed since the rendition of that judgment, and it
never has been, and I trust never will be, reversed. What principle
did it involve and settle ? it was this, that the power to determine
whether an alien might or might not live in the State, and to prescribe and protect the rights and fix the status of an alien, resident
in a State, belonged to the State, and not to the general government; and the power to punish any violation of his rights, as a
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necessary consequence, belongs also to the State. This principle
seems to me clearly applicable to the case now under consideration.
When a negro is unlawfully imported, though the importer may
intend him as a slave, the law considers and makes him a free man,
by expressly providing that no person can ever acquire a legal title
to him as property. The law also properly provides for his removal
out of the country as one of the means necessary and proper to
carry out the execution of the power to prohibit importation. So
long as he remains in the possession, or under the control of the
importer, or his agents or employees, he is under the power of the
general government and its laws. But when the commercial act
of importation is entirely complete and ended, and he has passed
out of the possession or control of the importer or his agents or
employees, and has been mingled with the mass of the population in
a State, he is a free negro alien, resident in the State, and like any
other free negro in the State, his status, his rights, and his remedies for injuries, are subjects of State jurisdiction and regulation ;
except (as has been stated) that the general government may remove him out of the country. While he remains here, however,
he is subject to the State laws, and his rights are regulated and protected by them. Alabama has not neglected her duty in this
respect. Her laws most amply provide for the protection of his
freedom. If any person, knowing him to be free, should buy or sell
him as a slave, such person would be subject to ten years imprisonment in the penitentiary, under section 3102 of the code of Alabama.
The next precedent to which I shall refer, is the case of Brown vs.
The State of .1aryfland, 12 Wheaton, 419, decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1827, after great consideration.
This case, like the one before me, depended upon the extent and
limit of the power over foreign commerce, granted by the constitution to the general government. Congress had passed laws laying
duties on goods imported. The legislature of Maryland passed an
act requiring every importer of goods into Maryland to pay a license
tax offifqj dollarsto the State, before he could sell the goods, though
he had paid the duties upon them. The constitutionality of this
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Maryland act was questioned, on the ground that Congress had
exclusive power over foreign commerce, and the State could not,
directly or indirectly, lay any tax on the importation. It was held
by the Supreme Court, that while the imported article remained the
property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the form or package
in which it was imported, it was not subject to State taxation ; but
when it has passed out of the possession of the importer,and become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it loses its distinctive characterof an import, and becomes subject to the taxitIg power of the State. The same principle was again
laid down by the Supreme Court in the license cases, in 1847. 5
Howard, 504. In these cases the laws of New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, imposing a State license tax on the sale
of spirituous liquors, under certain quantities, by the importer, were
held to be constitutional.
These two cases define, with much clearness, the extent and limits
of the power of Congress as to goods imported. Does not the same
principle apply to persons brought into the United States from foreign countries ? It was so held by the Supreme Court, in the passenger cases. 7 Howard, 283-573. The legislatures of New York
and Massachusetts each passed acts laying a tax on passengers
brought into any port of these States from a foreign country. The
constitutionality of these acts was questioned, on the ground that
the bringing in of emigrants is a branch of foreign commerce, exclusively under the control of the federal government. Several cases,
arising under these acts, were taken up to the Supreme Court. The
cases were ably and elaborately argued and re-argued at four different terms of the court, by some of the ablest lawyers in America.
The judges of the Supreme Court were divided in opinion upon the
question. Five of them, McLean, Wayne, Catron, Grier and
McKinley, held the State laws to be unconstitutional; and four of
them, Taney, Woodbury, Daniel and Nelson, held them to be constitutional. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering his opinion, after a
course of very able reasoning, says : "1 think it, therefore, to be
very clear, both upon principle and the authority of adjudged cases,
that the several States have a right to remove from among their
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people, and to prevent from entering, any person or class or description of persons whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the
interests and the welfare of its citizens ; and that the State has the
exclusive right to determine, in its sound discretion, whether the
danger does or does not exist, free from the control of the general
government." 7 How. 467.
Judge McLean, one of the majority, said: "When the merchandise is taken from the ship, and becomes mingled with the property
of the people of the State, like other property it is subject to the
local law; but until this shall take place, the memhandise is an
import, and is not subject to the taxing power of the State, and the
same rule applies to passengers. When they ltave the ship, and
mingle with the citizens of the State, they become subject to its
laws. 7 Howard, 405.
This case shows, then, that in this respect, the same principle
applies to the importation of both goods and persons; that is, that
until the commercial transaction of importation is complete and
ended, they are subject to the commercial power and laws of the
United States; but when the commercial transaction,of importation
is complete and ended, and the goods become mingled with the property, and the persons with the people of a State, they both then
become subject to the State jurisdiction and State laws. It obviously makes no difference that the persons are negroes, and intended
by the importer as slaves. Whether they are to be considered as
slaves or free, as chattels or persons, the same principle applies to
them. The cases referred to show the extent and limit of this power
over foreign commerce. It covers and extends to the whole commercial transaction of importation; and, in respect to negroes
unlawfully imported as slaves, to their removal out of the country.
This is its extent and its limit. In my opinion, it never was the
intention of the framers of the constitution, that the several States
should surrender to the general government this power to fix the
status, prescribe the rights and provide for the protection of free
negroes, or any other inhabitants of a State. Suppose that a negro,
unlawfully imported, is residing in Alabama, either as a free man,
or wrongfully held as a slave, and that any person should beat,
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maim or murder such a negro in Alabama, what law would be violated, and under what law could the offender be tried and punished ?
Most unquestionably the State law. So, too, if be is wrongfully
deprived of his freedom, it is the State law which is violated, and
the State law under which the offender is to be punished. Such an
offence has no connection with, or relation to foreign commerce, and
is entirely without and beyond the power given to Congress over
any branch of foreign commerce.
Looking, then, to the mischief intended to be remedied, and to
the nature, extent and limits of the constitutional grant7 of power
over this subject, I think the proper construction of the law is, that
it embraces and provides for the punishment of every person who,
in any manner, directly or indirectly, participates, aids or abets in
the importation of negroes as slaves. The capitalist who furnishes
the money-the agents who build, charter or fit out a slave shipthe officers and crew who navigate it-those who procure the cargo,
or who receive the negroes when landed, or carry them into the
interior, or hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of them there, for the
importer-are all participants in the unlawful importation, and
guilty of an offence against the constitutional laws of the United
States, and punishable under those laws. But after such a negro
has passed out of the possession or control of the importer and his
agents and employees, and has become mingled with the inhabitants
of Alabama, if any person beats, murders, or otherwise criminally
violates his rights, in this State, the offender is liable to indictment
under the State law, and before the State tribunals alone. Whilst,
as judge of this court, I shall always be ready and willing to maintain and enforce this, and all other constitutional powers and laws
of the general government, it is equally my duty not to go beyond
the limits of the constitution, or to encroach, in the slightest degree,
upon the rights and jurisdictions of the States.
Under the construction which I give to the law, the indictment
in this case is not maintainable. It does not allege that the accused
had any connection whatever with the unlawful importation; nor
does it allege any facts from which this could be legally inferred.
It simply alleges that the accused knowingly held, as a slave, in
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Alabama, a negro, who had previously been unlawfully imported,
by some other unknown person. This, I think, is not an indictable
offence under the laws of the United States.
It is contended for the prosecution, that the 6th section of the Act
of 20th April, 1818, provides for the punishment of the importer,
his agents and employees; and that the 7th section (under -which
this indictment is found) creates a separate and distinct offence, and
was intended to embrace the case of a person who, without any participation in the unlawful importation, afterwards holds the negro
as a slave.
I concur with the District Attorney, in thinking that the 7th
section intended to create a separate and distinct offence from that
created by the 6th section. It would be very unreasonable, if not
absurd, to suppose that Congress, after creating an offence by the
6th section, and providing that it should be punished by a forfeiture,
not exceeding $10,000 and not less than $1,000, and imprisonment
for not less than three nor more than seven years, immediately
added another section, providing that the same offence should be
punishable by a forfeiture of only $1,000. No doubt a different
offence was created by the 7th section, but I do not think the difference is that supposed by the District Attorney. By comparing
the Act of 1818 with the previous Act of 21st March, 1807, on the
same subject, and bearing in mind the state of things existing when
each of these acts was passed, I think the real difference is apparent
enough, though from the mere omission of a comma, it is not so
clearly expressed in the act of 1818 as in that of 1807. At both
of these periods slavery existed in Florida and Mexico, then belonging to Spain, and immediately adjoining the United States. Slaves
might be brought into the United States from Africa or from
Florida or Mexico. Congress manifestly considered that the person who seized a negro in Africa, and brought him to the United
States, was guilty of a much greater offence than one who, living in
the United States, near the Florida or Mexican line, should buy a
slave from his neighbor in Florida or Mexico, and bring him into
the United States. The fifth section of the act of 1807 plainly
refers to the first class of offenders, and the 6th section of that act,
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I think, refers to the latter class of offenders, and provides a milder
punishment. The 7th section of the act of 1818 is obviously taken,
almost verbatim, from the 6th section of the act of 1807, and, I
think, was intended to apply only to the same class of offences. I
can see no other sensible meaiing and effect that can be given to
the qualifying words, "immediately adjoining to the United States,"
used in each of those sections, and which are not used in the 6th
section of the act of 1818. A comma is placed before these qualifying words where they occur in the act of 1807. Thus, "from any
foreign kingdom, place or country, or from the dominions of any
foreign State, immediately adjoining to the United States," etc.thus making the words "immediately adjoining to the United
States," apply to and qualify the words "foreign kingdom, place or
country," as well as the words, "dominion of any foreign State."
The very same words are used in the 7th section of the act of
1818, omitting the comma between the words "State" and "immediately." This omission of the comma was, I presume, from an
inadvertence of the writer, or a mistake of the printer. I cannot
believe it was done purposely to change the character and extent of
the offence. My construction of these sections of the act of 1818
is, that the 6th section was intended to apply to those who bring in
negroes, as slaves from Africa, or other foreign countries, not immemediately adjoining the United States. The 7th section was intended to apply to those who brought them in from Florida or
Mexico. This, I think, is the difference between them as to the
character of the offence. This construction brings the whole law
within the constitutional limits of the power of Congress.
But even if this construction of the law is not correct, and that
contended for by the District Attorney is correct, still the indictment cannot be sustained vnder the 7th section. The offence created
by it is not a common law offence. It is purely a statutory offence,
created by -that section of the act.
It is an established rule of criminal law, that if a statute creates
an offence, and by the same clause prescribes a particular mode of
proceeding, otherwise than by indictment, to enforce the penalty,
the mode of procedure prescribed by the statute must be followed,
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and an indictment cannot be maintained. Wharton's Amer. Crim.
Law, § 10; 2 Burr. 805; 1 Archb. Cr. Pr. and Pl. 2; 6 Humph.
17; 7 Spear, 305; 12 Illinois, 235; 3 Alabama, 375. The penalty
prescribed by the seventh section for a violation of ,its provisions, is
a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for each negro, " one moiety to
the use of the United States, and the other to the use of the person
or persons who may sue for such forfeiture, and prosecute the same
to effect." The mode of procedure thus prescribed, for imposing the
penalty, is not by indictment, or any other criminal procedure, but
a civil suit, well known as a qui tam action. Upon this ground,
also, the indictment cannot be supported.
It is unnecessary to examine the other more technical objections
to the indictment. For the reasons stated, the demurrer to the indictment is sustained, and there must be a judgment for the defendant.

in the District Court of the United States for the EasternDistrict
of Pennsylvania.
THE UNITED STATES vs. JEREMIAH BUCK.
1. A fugitive slave, having been brought by the marshal, under a warrant of arrest,
before the Circuit Court, the case was heard, and a certificate, whose contents
were conformable to the requirements of the act of 18th September, 1850, authorizing his removal to the State from which he had escaped, was delivered to the
claimant.

The claimant having afterwards made an affidavit that he apprehended

a rescue, the marshal retained the fugitive in custody, placing him in charge of
certain deputies, or assistants, who, when engaged in removing him, were obstructed by the defendant.

The acts of obstruction constituted, or included, an

attempt to rescue the fugitive from custody.

When this occurred, neither the

claimant, nor any private person as his agent, was present.

Held: that for the

purpose of the removal of the fugitive, and for incidental purposes, the certifi.
cate had established conclusively the relation of the claimant to the fugitive to
be that of a proprietary master to his servant; that the subsequent custody of
the marshal was lawful only in consequence of the master's affidavit, and might
have been terminated by him at any time; that if it had been thus terminated,
or had been interrupted, or had never taken effect, the right of custody would
have been in the master alone; that the marshal's custody, while it continued,
was not incompatible with any reasonable intervention, control, direction or par-
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ticipation of the master in which the marshal might acquiesce; but that the
custody, unless actually assumed by the master, was, through his affidavit, continued in the marshal, in the same official character in which he had held the
fugitive under the warrant of arrest; that the defendant might, therefore, have
been indicted under the 22d section of the act of 30th April, 1790, for obstructing
the marshal as an officer; but that he was liable also to indictment under the
7th section of the act of 18th September, 1850, for the attempt to rescue from the
custody of the marshal and his assistants.
2. Under an indictment for such an attempt, the prosecution maybe maintained without the adduction of any independent evidence that the fugitive owed service or
labor, and had escaped from the State in which it was due.
3. Such.anindictment contained averments of the issuing of the warrant of arrest, and
of the subsequent proceedings, including the certificate and affidavit. These
averments were preceded by allegations that the fugitive had escaped, and that
be owed, in the State from which he had escaped, service or labor, to the claimant. Held: that the enactments of the law of 18th September, 1850, as to the
conclusiveness of the certificate, rendered these preceding allegations matters
of mere inducement, and that, the certificate having been produced in evidence,
no independent proof of them was required in order to sustain the prosecution.
4. Such a prosecution is not maintainable unless the defendant acted "knowingly and
willingly." But his only ignorance that can excuse him is ignorance of the
custody or of its lawfulness. Where he might, upon inquiry, have really known
the truth, his omission to inquire is evidence from which his actual knowledge of
the truth may be inferred. This is particularly the case where the custody is
official.
5. A court of the United States ought never to sit with its doors of entrance closed, so
as to prevent publicity in its proceedings. But, its police must be maintained.
Where the court has not prescribed any general rule, or made any special or particular order on the subject, the specific duty of the marshal to maintain and
regulate its police according to law, is an incident of his general duty to attend
the court. When, during the pendency of a particular proceeding, there is reason
to believe that an unrestricted admission of pergons of a known class or association would endanger the security of the administration of justice, or, in any
manner prevent the police of the court from being properly maintained, the marshal, without excluding absolutely such persons as a class, may adopt prudential
measures to prevent their indiscriminate admission, regulating the exercise of
his discretion so that their exclusion is not carried beyond the exigency of the
particular occasion.

The charge of the court was delivered by
CADWALADER, J.-The government of the United States exists
through a delegation of specifically defined powers, which the seve-
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ral States have yielded upon certain conditions. The rightful
continuance of the government is dependent upon the faithful performance of these conditions. One of them is that fugitives from
justice, found in a State into which they have fled, shall be delivered
up for removal to the State having jurisdiction of their alleged
crimes. Another condition is, that slaves escaping from one State
into another, shall be surrendered. In the case of a fugitive from
justice, the surrender is to be made on the demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled. In the case of slaves,
it is to be made upon a claim by the party to whom their service
or labor is due. In legislating for the fulfilment of these two
constitutional conditions, Congress has never assumed the power of
disposing at pleasure of the custody of a fugitive of either kind.
The constitution would not have sanctioned any such arbitrary
legislation. The fugitive from justice has been surrendered into
the custody, not of an officer of the United States, but of an agent
or duly accredited representative of the State, by whose executive
authority the demand has been made. The fugitive slave cannot,
unless at the desire of the claimant whose right has been established,
be delivered into any other custody than that of such claimant.
When, at his desire, the fugitive is delivered into the custody of
an officer of the United States, this officer's custody is temporary,
and its purpose limited. It exists only for the protection or security
of the right which has been established, and cannot be exclusive of
the control of the possessor of such right. This right is that of a
proprietary master of the fugitive. The legal importance of keeping this distinctive character of it in view, will be seen hereafter.
In the first legislation of Congress, under these two clauses of
the constitution, the subjects of both were provided for in 'a single
statute. This act, which was passed on 12th February, 1793, has
not been followed by any further legislation, so far as the surrender
of fugitives from justice is concerned. The jurisdiction under this
head is not exercisable under the act by the judges or officers of the
United States, but by the governments of the several States. The
jurisdiction and powers for the surrender and return of fugitives
from service or labor were vested by the act in judicial officers of
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the United States, and concurrently, in certain local magistrates of
the several States.
This legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was extended by
the act of 18th September, 1850. So far as this act has modified
or superseded the previous law, no jurisdiction or authority is vested
in any State officer or magistrate.
The owner of a fugitive slave is not bound to proceed under either
of these laws. He may follow the slave into the State into which
he has escaped, and may, without any legal process, arrest him
there: and may, without any judicial certificate, or other legal
attestation of the right of removal, carry him back to the State
from which he escaped. All this may be done lawfully. But, if
the owner does not, under one act, or the other, obtain a certificate
of his right of removal, he becomes liable as a trespasser, for the
arrest, detention and removal, unless he can prove the escape, and
that the fugitive owed him service or labor in the State from which
he fled.
In a proceeding under the act of 12th February, 1793, the arrest
of a fugitive slave was made without any warrant or other process.
He was taken by the claimant, or his agent, before a judge of one
of the courts of the United States, or a local magistrate, who, upon
the adduction of the requisite proof, gave a certificate which served
as a warrant for the removal of the fugitive to the State or territory from which he had escaped. This act contained no express
provision that the certificate should have any conclusive effect as
proof of the right of -removal. The act of 18th September, 1850,
provides that the alleged fugitive may be arrested by the claimant,
either without process, or under a warrant issued by zLcourt or
judge of the United States, or by one of the commissioners of a
certain description, appointed by designated courts of the United
States. It vested in any one of these commissioners a jurisdiction
concurrent and co-extensive with that exercisable by a court of the
United States, or one of the judges of such a court. This act
required the marshals of the United States and their deputies to
obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under its provisions when to them directed. It imposed a pecuniary penalty for
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any refusal or neclect to receive or execute such 1'-Ces, and made
the nail-hal, in case of an escape, with, or without his as ent, after
arre.t, liable on his official bond for the value of the fugitive,
according to a prescribed standard. The commis,-ioners were authorized, within their respective counties, to depute, by writing, one
or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute such warrants and other process as might be issued by them in the lawful
performance of their respective duties. The commissioners, or the
persons thus deputed by them to execute process, were authorized
to summon, and call to their aid, the by-standers, or posse commitatus, when necessary. Their warrants were to run anQ be executed
any where in the State within which they were issued.
Ia a proceeding conducted according to the provisions of this act,
the alleged fugitive, whether arrested under a warrant, or without
process, is brought before a court or judge of the United States, or
a commissioner, whose duty it is to hear the case of the claimant in
a summary manner. If the claim is established, tire court, or judge,
or commissioner, delivers to the claimant or his agent, a certificate
setting forth substantially the facts established, and authorizing
him to use the reasonable force and restraint necess:ry, under the
circumstances of the case, for the return of the fugitive to the State
whence he escaped.
This law makes the certificate thus delivered conclusive of the
rihLt to remove the ftgitive to such State, and enacts that it shall
prevent all molestation of the claimant by any process issued by
any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever. The
certificate as described succinctly in the 4th, and more fully in the
6th section, answers a two-fold legal purpose. It ascertains the
claimant's right to remove the fugitive, and constitutes, or includes,
a warrant for his removal.
In a prior stage of the cause, I had occasion to express an
opinion, which I now repeat, that, under an indictment for an
offence against this law, committed after such a certificate has been
delivered to the claimant, its production in evidence renders independent proof that the fugitive owed service or labor to the claimant, and that he escaped from the State in which it was due, unne-
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cessary on the part of the prosecution. I also expressed an opinion
that though such an indictment contained allegations that he had
escaped, and owed the service or labor, followed by an averment
that the certificate had been awarded, the enactments of the law of
1850, as to the conclusiveness of the certificate, rendered these
preceding allegations matters of mere inducement, of which no
independent proof was required in order to sustain the prosecution.
I still am of this opinion. The question, whether the alleged fugitive was a slave or not cannot be tried under such an indictment.
Where the claimant, after the certificate of his right has been
issued, makes affidavit that he has reason to apprehend a forcible
rescue of the fugitive before he can be taken beyond the limits of
the State in which the arrest was made, the act requires the officer
who made it to retain the custody of the fugitive, and remove him
to the State whence he fled, and there deliver him to the claimant.
The act also authorizes and requires the officer to employ and retain
for this purpose, at the expense of the United States, as many persons as he may deem necessary to overcome such force. In a clause
which defines the rate of compensation for such service, and of the
allowance for expenses, the persons thus employed by the officer
are designated as his assistants. The standard here prescribed is
that of the compensation and allowance in cases of transportation
by the marshal of persons charged as criminals.
In the present case, the testimony shows that, under a warrant
of arrest, a fugitive slave had, under this act, been brought in the
lawful custody of the marshal before a judge of the Circuit Court,
that the right of the claimant had been established, and the certificate pregcribed by the act of 1850 had been issued, when the
claimant's affidavit that he had reason to apprehend a forcible rescue
was regularly made, that a copy of this affidavit was in the hands
of the marshal, or his principal deputy, that the marshal, therefore,
conformably to the provisions of the law, retained the fugitive in
custody, and was in the act of rdmoving him from the court house,
when the occurrences on which the prosecution is founded took
place.
These occurrences were very remarkable. They took place in
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the public street, in the face of day, in open defiance of the law.
The doorway leading from this court into Fifth street is distant not
more than about sixty yards from the point on the north side of
Chestnut street, a little westward of Seventh street, where the defendant was arrested. The intervening space is occupied, on the
same side of Fifth street, by offices of the police of the city. There
was in the street a crowd chiefly composed of colored persons.
More than fifty officers of the city police were stationed there to
keep the passage clear. These officers wore their badges. This
was the state of things when the fugitive was brought by the marshal, or his principal deputy, through the Fifth street doorway,
and placed in a carriage. Three deputies or assistants of the marsh.l, including his principil deputy, took seats inside of the carriage,
and another assistant or deputy took a seat by the driver. The
carriage then got under way towards Chestnut street. An immediate movement from the eastern footway towards the street pavement appears to have been made by colored persons who crowded
forward in such a manner as to impede the progress of the carriage.
An attempt to stop it was made when it had advanced only a few
paces. Before it reached Chestnut street, this attempt had been
repeated once or twice, if not three times. The speed of the horses
was increased as they approached Chestnut street, and was becoming rapid as their heads were turned westward in order to pass up
that street. At this point, the portion of the crowd which had been
in the carriage way of the street, appears to have been left behind,
but to have been following closely in the rear. The carriage would
probably have soon left the great body of them far behind, if its
progress had not been again stopped in a more violent manner than
on the previous occasions. Here, some colored persons, who rushed
from both footways into the carriage way, seized the heads of the
horses on both sides, and forced them on the side walk against an
iron awning post, when several arrests, including that of the defendant, were made by officers of the city police. The period from
the time at which the carriage left the door of the court house to
the time of their arrest, was probably not more than one or two
minutes. There had been confusion and noise during the whole o.

THE UNITED STATES vs. BUCK.

this period, the colored persons crowding towards the carriage and
exhibiting great excitement. Several witnesses heard the word
"rescue" shouted. Robert Williamson says that he heard it
shouted loud by more than one voice before the carriage reached
the corner of Chestnut street. Edward G. Wood and Robert
Wilson state that White, one of the men arrested, called "rescue."
Wilson says that White called "rescue" before Buck, the defendant,
came up. Seven witnesses, namely, Trefts, Robinson, Brodie,
Wood, Barry, Axe, and Williamson, positively identify the defendant as one of the three principal actors in the scene which occurred
when the horses were forced upon the pavement. Mr. Wood,
Robert Williamson, Axe and Barry describe this occurrence particularly. The clearest account seems to have been that of Mr.
Wood. According to their testimony, White seized the horses on
one side and the defendant on ihe other, while Green took hold of
the traces and with an uplifted cane was striking at the driver.
Barry describes the defendant as the person most active in hauling
the horses on the footway. Mr. Axe, the policeman who arrested
him, describes him as violently excited and exerting great strength
in keeping his hold on their heads. White and Green were arrested
at about the same time. What occurred afterwards is not important except that their arrest seems not to have prevented a fresh
outbreak of similar violence. The crowd moved up Chestnut street,
and the disturbance continued. If you believe the witnesses for the
prosecution, and give due effect to their testimony, you will probably have no doubt that the defendant, at the time of his arrest, was
engaged, with others, both in obstructing the execution of process
by the marshal, and in attempting to rescue from custody the fugitive whom the marshal's deputies had in charge. The latter, as I
will state hereafter, is the only offence for which the defendant is
on trial.
The defendant is not guilty unless he thus acted knowingly
and willingly. He however cannot allege ignorance of law as an
excuse. No man can ever allege this excuse. Every person is
bound, and is presumed, to know the law. Otherwise the pretence
or excuse of ignorance of it would be urged in every case. The
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only ignorance that can be alleged in excuse, is ignorance of the fact
which renders an act unlawful. In this case, the only excuse which
could be admitted under this head is that of ignorance that the
fugitive was in lawful custody. The question of such ignorance in
cases under the fugitive slave laws has usually arisen where an
alleged fugitive was in the hands of the claimant, or his agent, that
is to say, in the hands of private persons not officers of the law.
The Circuit Court of the United States for the Ohio district have
decided many such cases, particularly under the act of 1793. In
two cases, that court used words which I will quote: "To bring an
individual within the statute, he must have knowledge that the
colored persons are fugitives from labor, or, he must act under such
circumstances as show that he might have had such knowledge by
exercising ordinary prudence." (4 McLean, 420; 6 Ibid. 268.)
Without stating any rule in this precise form of words, I instruct
you that if the defendant, from circumstances within his observation or means of immediate inquiry, might readily have known
the truth, a belief of his actaul knowledge of it may be reasonably
deduced. In cases of mere private custody of an alleged fugitive, the
application of such a rule may, according to varying circumstances,
be difficult or easy. But there seldom can be difficulty where the
custody, is that of an official person. The true character of such a
custody if not apparent or known, may usually be ascertained without any difficulty, by a person desirous of knowing the truth. In
this case, the place, the persons, and the circumstances, indicated
that the custody was both lawful and official. Could there have
otherwise been any doubt, it would have been removed by the fact
that the city police, with their badges exhibited, were on the spot.
They would, if there had been anything unlawful, have been the
persons to redress the wrong. If you believe the testimony, they
must have been seen to be protecting, or endeavoring to protect, the
carriage and those in it from such violence as that in which the defendant was immediately afterwards engaged. You probably, therefore, would have no difficulty in finding that he acted knowingly
and willingly, if the case rested upon the testimony for the prosecution alone.
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But the defendant has examined a number of witnesses, as persons in the same situation as himself in respect of the occurrences in
controversy, every one of whom, so far as I remember-certainly
almost every one-knew the general character and particular description of the case that was pending; knew that the person put
into the carriage was the fugitive, or alleged fugitive ; knew that he
was in custody of the marshal; knew the person of either the marshal himself, or of one of the deputies who accompanied the prisoner ; and knew the court room and the marshal's office, and, of
course, knew the doorway leading from it into the street. [Som
parts of the testimony under this head were here particularly quoted
by the court in the words of the respective witnesses.]
The defendant's testimony on other points is of no materiality
that I can perceive. [Here the court reviewed this testimony in
detail, comparing it with the counter evidence.] If the jury take a
different view of the evidence, the decision upon the facts is for
them, and not for the court. This remark applies to all the facts
in the cause. If there is any reasonable doubt concerning them,
the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it. The testimony as to
his general good character should avail him so far as it may serve
to create any reasonable doubt of his guilt, or to increase any doubt
of it that might otherwise have existed.
A suggestion on behalf of the defendant is made in the form of
a complaint urged against the marshal, or some of his deputies, for
keeping colored persons out of the court room during the hearing of
the case of the fugitive slave, though white persons were admitted
without objection. I do not understand the bearing of the testimony under this head as matter of defence. If the complaint were
well founded, it would not justify, or excuse, an assault upon the
officers, much less an obstruction of the execution of legal process,
or an attempted rescue from official custody. Independently of any
question in this cause, the subject is, however, of great importance;
and, as it has been publicly discussed, should not be passed without
notice.
If colored persons, as a class, were excluded from the court room
for any reason which would not, under like circumstances, apply to
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white persons, a mistake was committed. The marshal had no right
or power to exclude them for any such reason. I cannot believe
that be or his deputies were so ignorant of their duty that such a
mistake was committed. But, if a class of persons, white or colored,
are, for any reason, dangerous attendants upon a court, so dangerous as to interfere with its police and security, some discrimination as to their unlimited admission, may, from necessity, be exercisable while the danger continues. Courts of justice must be open;
but their police must also be maintained. If a subject of judicial
investigation is one as to which any known class of persons are too
much excited in feeling to be able patiently to attend upon its discussion, an indiscriminate admission of all persons of the class would
sometimes be very dangerous. [Here the court exemplified this
proposition in its possible application to cases other than that in
question.] In the case of a fugitive slave, the danger of admitting
indiscriminately persons whose feelings might have prompted them to
act like those who made the attack upon the carriage on the occasion in question, might endanger the police of a court. This danger,
where it exists, the marshal, who maintains its police, cannot properly disregard. A discrimination of some kind appears to have
been exercised by him on the occasion in question. Colored persons, including those who afterwards committed acts of illegal force,
appear to have attended in great numbers, and to have endeavored
to obtain admission into the court room an hour before the time at
which the court was to be opened. Had they been indiscriminately
admitted at that time, the court room and its avenues would probably have been occupied by them to the exeluion of all other persons. What may have been observable during that hour of the
temper and feeling of these colored persons, what may have been
known of the character or former conduct of any of them, we could
not here inquire. But, the events of the afternoon prove that there
may have been sufficient reason for the marshal's refusal to admit
them indiscriminately in the morning. We have no means of inquiring into the reasons by which his discrimination was particularly
The testimony shows that colored persons of good
regulated.
character, whose usual deportment was quiet and orderly, were not
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able to command their feelings on the day in question so as to
abstain from acts of lawless violence. This proves that any exercise of discrimination on his part must have been attended with
embarrassing difficulties, and, possibly, dangers. That colored persons generally were excluded from the court room seems to be true.
That they were not excluded indiscriminatelyis, however, not less
true. In the course of the testimony it came out casually that the
marshal himself directed the admission of one to whom entrance had
been refused by the deputy, and that the deputy, without the marshal's order, admitted another. There is no reason to believe that
others may not also have been admitted. One witness, the colored
clergyman, who was refused admittance, says that he had "quite a
squabble" with one of the marshal's deputies. This witness admits
that his feelings were deeply interested. How far he may have been
excited, whether he may have used language of a tendency to excite
the feelings of others, are inquiries which would have been out of
place here. But such considerations may not have been improperly
entertained by the marshal on that occasion. Besides his duty to
maintain the police of the court, he had the custody of the fugitive,
and was liable for an escape though he had been forcibly rescued.
We therefore cannot, in a collateral proceeding like the present,
ascertain whether his conduct was, or was not, wisely regulated in
the precautions which he used in order to prevent an indiscriminate
admission of all persons into the court room. Had a rescue been
the result of his omission to adopt adequate precautions, the case
might have undergone an investigation in which his neglect would
not have been thought excusable. It is fortunate for the jury, and
for the country, that we are not now engaged in such an investigation.
The duty of stating and explaining the law of the case remains to
be performed. This duty devolves upon the court. In a criminal
case, the jury can judge of the law as well as of the facts. But
where the jury cannot know the law otherwise than as it may be
stated by the court, their duty is to believe that the court states it
correctly. If there existed no law for the punishment of an act like
that of which the evidence tends to prove this defendant guilty, the

THE UNITED STATES vs. BUCK.

United States would cease to have a government. No government
can be administered unless its laws can be enforced, and resistance
of their execution punished. Under the government of the United
States, large standing military garrisons posted throughout the land
in strong fortresses, have not been thought necessary for the enforcement of the laws. No such military organization will become
necessary, so long as the government's judicial organs, which designation includes juries as well as courts, fulfil their duties to the Constitution and the laws.
The only question of law which has not already been sufficiently
considered is, whether the present prosecution can be sustained
under the indictment? The 'act of 1793 imposed penalties for
obstructing an arrest by the claimant, and rescuing, harboring or
concealing the fugitive. But these were only pecuniary amounts,
recoverable in a civil action by the claimant for his own benefit.
Under this act, there was no official custody of an alleged fugitive
slave, except constructively, during the hearing before the judge or"
magistrate. But, under the act of 1850, thb proceedings may, at
every stage of them, be conducted under legal sanction, and the
alleged fugitive may, not only during the hearing, but before and
after it, be in custody under legal process. This, however, as we
have already seen, is an optional method of proceeding. The claimant, in person or by an unofficial agent, may still make the arrest
without process, and bring the fugitive before the court, or judge, or
commissioner ; and, after the receipt of a certificate under the act,
may take the fugitive into his private custody, without asking official
protection of any kind. The 7th section of the act, in view of these
alternative and optional modes of proceeding, made it a criminal
offence knowingly and willingly to obstruct, hinder, or prevent tae
claimant, his agent or assistants, from arresting the fugitive, with
or without process, or to rescue or attempt to rescue him from the
custody of the claimant, his agent or assistants, when arrested, or
to aid, abet, or assist the escape of the fugitive from the claimant,
his agent, "or other person or persons legally authorized as aforesaid," or to harbor or conceal the fugitive so as to prevent his diccovery and arrest after notice or knowledge that he was a fugitive
from service or labor.
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The indictment is founded upon this enactment. It charges an
attempted rescue of the fugitive. The first count, after stating the
warrant of arrest, and subsequent proceedings to the granting of
the certificate, avers that the affidavit of apprehension of a rescue
was afterwards made by the claimant, and lays the offence as an
attempt to rescue from the custody of the marshal, and the persons
employed by him according to the provisions of the act. The second
count, not mentioning the affidavit, lays the offence as an attempt
to rescue from the custody of the claimant, and certain persons
described as his assistants, who, in fact, were the marshal, and persons mentioned in the first count. These two counts are properly
joined in the same indictment. But it does not follow that a verdict
of guilty upon both can be properly found. " If the claimant, after
the receipt by him of the certificate, had not taken the affidavit,
your verdict, if rendered against the defendant, would have been
properly found upon the seconl count. But, as the affidavit *was
taken, and neither the claimant, nor any unofficial agent on his
part, was actually present when the offence was committed, the verdict, if against the defendant, should, I think, be a verdict of guilty
upon the first count only.
The remaining inquiry, therefore is, whether the prosecution can
be supported upon the first count? On this point I had some
doubt in an early stage of the trial; but this doubt has been removed,
and I am now of opinion that the prosecution, so far as the case
depends upon matter-of law, can be maintaincd upon this count.
The objections to this view of the question will be stated and
answered. They depend upon an assumption of three propositions.
The first is, that an obstruction of an officer of the United States in
the execution of legal process of any kind is indictable under the 22d
section of the act of Congress for the punishment of crimes, passed
on 30th April, 1790, before any legislation of the United States asto the recapture of fugitive slaves, and that the defendant, if guilty
of any offence, was indictable under that act. The second proposition is, that when the claimant, after the receipt of the certificate,
made the affidavit, the custody of the fugitive was in the marshal
alone, and was, in law, an exclusively official custody. The third,
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stated partly as an independent proposition, and partly as connected
with or dependent upon the first and second, is, that the 7th section
of the act of 1850 does not apply to any interference with or obstruction or prevention of an officer of the United States in the
execution of process, but was intended only for cases of interference
with, or obstruction of, private persons having a fugitive slave in lawful custody.
The first proposition, that this defendant might have been convicted under the act of 1790 of an obstruction of the mashal in the
execution of process, is, I think, true. I do not think that this
exempts the defendant from being liable also under the present indictment founded upon the act of 1850. The first proposition will,
however, be considered, in order that its connection, or want of connection, with the two others, may afterwards be discussed. The
22d section of the act of 1790 made it a criminal offence knowingly
and wilfully to obstruct, resist, or oppose any officer of the United
States in serving, or attempting to serve or execute any mesne process or warrant, or any rule or order of any of the courts of the
United States, or any other legal or judicial writ or process whatever, or to assault, beat, or wound any officer or other person duly
authorized in serving or executing any writ, rule, order, process or
warrant, aforesaid. This section, and some others of the same act,
are prospective in their operation- The section applies, therefore,
to obstructions of the execution of process by officers of the United
States acting under jurisdictions established by subsequent acts of
Congress. In the language of Judge Washington, it includes all
legal process in the hands of an officer of the United States. (3 W.
C. C. 338.) His language, which I have only partially quoted,
justifies the remark of Judge Curtis in the year 1851, repeated in
1851 , that "it embraces every legal process whatever, whether issued
by a court in session, or by a judge, or magistrate or commissioner,
acting in the due administration of any law of the United States."
(2 Curt. 639.) This remark, it is true, was made only in a charge
to a grand jury, and therefore has not the authority of an expression of an opinion in the course of a legal adjudication. But the
subject came soon after before the same judge in a judicial pro-
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ceeding, in which it was assumed, though not decided, that an attack
upon the marshal while in custody of an alleged fugitive from service, could, if the indictment was properly framed, be made the
subject of criminal prosecution under this section of the act of 1790.
It also appears that the subject had been for three years under the
consideration of Judge Curtis, without any change in this opinion
expressed by him originally in the year 1851. Independently of
this authority, I should, upon the words of the act and the authority
of Judge Washington's opinion, have arrived at the same conclusion.
I have, therefore, no difficulty in stating my opinion that any willful
obstruction of a marshal, deputy marshal, commissioner, or other
officer of the United States, while executing a warrant or arrest
under the fugitive slave law of 1850, or while in custody of a fugitive in consequence of a claimant's affidavit made after the certificate has been delivered to him, is indictable under the act of 1790.
But, I am of opinion, as will appear more fully in considering the
second proposition, that it is thus indictable only where the marshal
is in the actual custody of the fugitive.
The second proposition, as to the alleged exclusiveness of the
marshal's custody, has been in part anticipated at the commencement of this charge. The constitution requires the delivery of the
fugitive to the claimant, whose relation to him is that of a master
to a servant. As a husband may retake his wife, a parent his
child, or a guardian his ward, so a master may retake his servant
wherever he may find him; and, in the case of a servant of this
description, may retain him in custody and under control. In
defining the power and rights of the person to whom the service or
labor is due, elementary rules of jurisprudence as to these domestic
relations, contained in Blackstone's Commentaries (iii., 4,) have
therefore been adopted by the Supreme Court as applicable to the
interpretation of acts of congress passed under this clause of the
constitution, and even to the interpretation of the constitutional
provision itself. (16 Pet. 618; 5 How. 229.) A parent's or
guardian's custody of his child, or a master's proprietary custody
of his slave, may be assisted, promoted, enforced, or maintained, by
the custody of an official functionary. But, in an ordinary case,
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the assistance of such a functionary to the lawful custody of the
master, does not supersede or annul it, and, under the constitution
and laws of the United States, could not lawfully annul it. Consequently, though the marshal's custody of the fugitive in this case
was official, so far as it extended, yet, it was not through any legal
necessity, exclusive. It may have been exclusive in fact, but it was
not, even then, independent of possible intervention by the master.
The act of 1850, makes it the duty of the officer, after the certificate issued, upon*the affidavit of apprehension of rescue, to retain
the fugitive in custody for the purpose of removal. The counsel
on both sides agree that this word retain defines the character of
the official custody, which must, for general purposes, be the same
before and after the certificate. There is, however, a certain specific distinction which may, for particular purposes, be attended
with important differences. Until the certificate is issued, the right
of the claimant is undetermined. The period of the hearing of the
case may be excluded for the present from consideration. In this
period, there can be no control or direction on the part of the
claimant, and the custody of an officer must be subordinate to that
of the court, or judge or commissioner. The distinction to which I
advert is between the custody which before the hearing may exist
under the warrant of arrest, and the custody which may, after the
certificate, be retained by the officer in consequence of the affidavit
of apprehension of rescue. The warrant of arrest is legalproceess
directed to the officer, which he is bound to return to the court or
judge or commissioner. Whether the proceeding under this writ,
until it is executed by an arrest, is under the exclusive control of
the claimant, is a question which it is not necessary to decide.
When it has been primarily executed by an arrest, the claimant,
before it is returned to the court, or judge, or commissioner, may
possibly have the right of abandoning the proceeding, and ordering
the alleged fugitive to be set at liberty. Whether the alleged fugitive may not insist on being brought before the court, or judge or
commissioner, is a point upon which it is not necessary to express
an opinion. The claimant certainly cannot, for any other purpose
than that of the absolute liberation of the alleged fugitive, interfere
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with the official custody of him between the time of arrest, and the
time at which the process is returned to the court, or judge or commissioner. Unless there is an absolute discharge, the officer must
return it and bring in the alleged fugitive. To this extent, the
claimant, by taking out the process, has, until its return, surrendered or qualified the personal exercise of his alleged right as
master. But, in this interval between the arrest and the return,
the custody of the officer is, even to this extent, exclusive in those
cases only where it is an actual custody. When he does not find
the alleged fugitive, the claimant, if able to find him, can lawfully
take him. If, after arrest, the officer dies, or becomes incapable of
acting, or if he wrongfully refuses to retain the fugitive in order to
return the writ, and improperly liberates him, the claimant may
take or keep him as if there had not been any process. In these,
and in other cases which might be specified, the claimant, at the
peril of afterwards proving his ownership of the fugitive, may take
him or may temporarily control and regulate the custody. This
could not be done under process in an ordinary legal proceeding.
Under the warrant of arrest, there may possibly be difficulties inherent in some of these questions. But, there can be no such
complication after the certificate has conclusively settled the question of the right of removal. The marshal, or other official custodian-when the affidavit of apprenension of rescue has been taken
after certificate issued-retains his former custody against all the
world except the claimant; but he retains it for the exclusive protection and security of the claimant, whose concurrent, or substituted control or custody of the fugitive cannot then be wrongful.
The certificate is conclusive of the right of removal to the State
from which the fugitive had escaped, and no tribunal can question
its effect for the purposes of the removal; but, it is not, like the
warrant of arrest, returnable to the court, or judge, or commissioner by 'whom it was issued. It is not, like the warrant of arrest,
process directed to the officer. It is a certificate in favor of the
claimant himself. So far as it constitutes a warrant for the removal of the fugitive, it is exercisable by the claimant -whose right
has been established. The custody of the marshal is, therefore, as
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between him and the claimant, auxiliary only. He is an off eial
assistant of the claimant. In order to give the full protective
benefit of his official character to the claimant, the act of congress
prescribes that the custody shall be not less official than under the
former warrant of arrest. Nevertheless, the claimant in whose
favor the certificate has been awarded, may, at any time, discharge
the officer, or may act as the custodian of the fugitive while the officer
is present. Questions may indeed arise whether this can be reasonably done by a claimant who requires the continuance of the marshal's custody. But such questions can occur only between the
officer and the claimant, and must be settled between themselves.
Third persons cannot be ooncerned in any such question. The
custody of the marshal, therefore, though it may be exclusive in
faict, is not necessarily, from its character, exclusive in law. Consequently, as I have already instructed you, an indictment which
alleges an attempt to rescue from the custody of the officer and his
assistants would not be supported by the mere production of the
certificate of right of removal and affidavit of apprehension of
rescue, and proof of a subsequent attempt to rescue, without the
further proof, which has been adduced here, that the officer had, in
fact, the custody when the attempt was made.
If the foregoing views are correct, a principal difficulty which
might otherwise have been encountered in considering the third
proposition, has been removed. This proposition is, that the 7th
section was not intended to apply to an attempt to rescue from the
custody of an officer of the United States, but was applicable exclusively to such unlawful interferences with" unofficial custody, as
would not have been indictable under the act of 1790. When the
words of the 7th section are carefully considered, their applicability
to lawless interferences with such official custody as the other enactments of the statute authorize becomes unquestionable. The question specifically presented might be discussed on somewhat narrow,
or on more extended views. The result of each mode of reasoning
would, perhaps, be the same. Under the narrower view, it is
obvious that there might be cases of such attempts to rescue from
official custody as would fail or be frustrated before they amounted
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to obstructions of the official execution of process. Such attempts
would not be indictable under the act of 1790. According to the
argument in this case for the defence, an attempt of this kind to
rescue from private custody would b, indictable, but the more
aggravated offence of such an attempt to rescue from official custody
would not be punishable. There is no probability that this can
have been intended by congress. But the question may, I think,
be determined on the broader ground, that there is no distinction
between an official and an unofficial custody under the Tth section
of the act of 1850, except so far as the phraseology of indictments
may require variation in order to adapt them to the specific distinctions of different cases under the act.
That this was the opinion of Judge Nelson appears from his
charge to the grand jury, delivered at the October sessions of 1851,
in the Circuit Court for the northern district of New York,
(2 Blatchf. 560.) I do not refer to what he said in such a
charge as having the full force of judicial authority. But this
charge serves to explain the form of the indictment afterwards
found in the case of The United States vs. Reed. ib. 488. This
indictment had been removed by certificate, from the District into
the Circuit Court. In another case, the United States vs. Cobb,
in which the opinion of Judge Conkling, on a preliminary hearing,
is reported in 4 Amer. L. Jour. p. 1451, a bill had also been found
in the District Court; and, as I infer from a subsequent account
of it, had also been certified into the Circuit Court. In each case,
as we may infer from the reports which we have, the indictment
was founded upon the 7th section of the act of 1850. Both cases
arose from the rescue of an alleged fugitive slave on 1st October,
1851, at Syracuse. The rescue was from a deputy marshal who
bad him in custody under a warrant of arrest issued by a commis.
sioner. This rescue had prevented any hearing from taking place.
The case was, therefore, that of a rescue from a custody of a,
character as official as any of which the existence under the act of
I See also his charge to the Grand Jury, lb. pp. 258 to 260.
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1850, can be recognized as possible. A motion was made afterwards to quash the indictment. This was about a year after the
charge of Judge Nelson to the grand jury. The point now in
question does not appear to have been made in the argument of the
motion. It may perhaps have been reserved by counsel to be taken
on the trial, or upon a motion in arrest of judgment. But attention must have been directed to it from the remarks upon it in the
previous charge to the grand jury; and the reasoning and remarks
in the court's opinion (2 Blatchf. 467, 468,) seem to cover the
question, and to affirm the validity of an indictment under the act
of 1850, for a rescue from official custody.
The same view seems to have been tacitly assumed to be correct
in the Christianacase, in t*he Circuit Court for this district, under
an indictment for obstruction of process, tried before Judge Kane,
after the decision of a well known case arising from the same transaction, in which there had been a prosecution for treason. 4 Am.
L. Journal, 486.
Independently of any reported case, I would have arrived at this
conclusion upon the words of the act of 1850. It certainly makes
the offence of preventing an arrest indictable, whether the claimant,
or those assisting him were endeavoring to make it "with or without process ;" and the context shows a connection of these words
with the subsequent specification of the other offences, including
that of a rescue or attempt to rescue. Therefore, if the acts which
are in question in this case had occurred before the hearing, the
offence would have been indictable, though the alleged fugitive had
been in the custody of the marshal. Consequently, the official
character of the custody was, in the primary stage of the proceedlg, immaterial. We have seen that if there was any distinction
after the certificate and affidavit, the official character of the custody was then, in law, less material. But the act seems, in this
respect, to place them on the same footing, by enacting, in effect,
that the officer shall, in this latter stage of .the proceeding, retain
his former custody. The rule must, therefore, be the same in both
stages, and the reason for its application in the latter stage is more
forcible.
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I am consequently of opinion that, if you take the view of the
facts which the testimony appears to warrant, your verdict, so far
as the law of the case is concerned, should be that the defendant is
guilty on the first count, and not guilty upon the second count of
the indictment.
Verdict accordingly.

In the Supreme Court of Louisiana, June, 1859.
J. Q. PROFILET vs. HALL & HILDRETH, PROPRIETORS OF ST. CHARLES
HOTEL.
1. A notice, whether general or personal, by a hotel keeper, that all valuable arti-.
cles must be deposited in the safe of the hotel, and if not so deposited, that he
would not be responsible for them if lost, does not apply to articles of personalcomfort or convenience, as a watch or clothing.
2. But the hotel keeper will not be liable for the theft of such articles, if the lodger
has acted with negligence, or has not availed himself of ordinary precautions for
their protection.

Thus, where .a lodger coming to his room late at night in a
state of partial intoxication, omitted to require a key to his room, allowed the
door to remain unfastened, and left his watch and similar articles negligently
lying on a bureau, it was held that the hotel keeper was not responsible for their
loss.
,emble, that the existence of a state of intoxication on the part of a lodger at an
S3.
inn, raises a presumption of a want of proper care over his property on his part.

Appeal from the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, Howell, J.
A. N. Ogden and Stansbury, for plaintiff.
Clarke -and Bayne, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, J.-The plaintiff, a resident of the State of Mississippi,
alleges that he came to the city of New Orleans during the month
of July, 1857, and stopped at the St. Charles Hotel, a public house
of entertainment kept by Hall & Hildreth. That petitioner was
given in this hotel, room No. 124, and retired to rest therein. That
during the night of July 10th, 1857, the room occupied by him was
36
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entered, and the following articles, his property, were taken therefrom and wholly lost to him : one gold watch of the value of $225,
one seal ring worth $30, one masonic medal of the value of $20,
and $100 in bills of Louisiana banks.
The answer of defendants pleads the general denial; then specially
admits they are the proprietors of the St. Charles Hotel; that as
such they aver that they have provided a safe for the deposit of
valuable articles, and have given notice to all the inmates and the
visitors of their" hotel to place any valuable articles in this safe, and
if not so deposited they would not be responsible for them if lost;
that plaintiff had had due notice of this fact before he took lodgings
at the hotel, and was so bound thereby.
The District judge was of opinion that the possession of the
money and the loss thereof was not established, and rendered judgment for $225, the value proved on the trial, of the watch, ring and
medals. Defendants have appealed.
Laws have been made in different countries and periods regulating the obligations of keepers of hotels and inns. The Spanish
law made the keepers of inns and hotels responsible for "everything which travellers, either by sea or land, put into inns
or taverns, or ships that navigate the sea or rivers to the knowledge of the owners thereof, or of those that act in their places,"
which was lost through their neglect, fraud or other fault, or if
stolen "by any persons who come with the travellers." This law,
however, limited the liability of inn or hotel keepers in certain cases.
The first is, where they tell the traveller, before they receive him,
to take care of his own effects, as that they would not be responsible
for them if they should be lost. The second is, where *they show
him, before they receive him, a trunk or chamber, saying "if you
choose to stay here put your things in that trunk or chamber and
take the key into your own keeping." The third is, where the
things are lost by some fortuitous event, as by fire, &c. Partida
5th, title 8th, law 26th, vol. 2, page 744. The Spanish laws seem
to have held them liable when it was to their knowledge, or to that
of their agent, that the traveller had put property in their inns Or
hotels.
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The civil law declares that there is formed between the innkeeper
and traveller an agreement, in most cases tacit, by which the innkeeper obliges himself to the traveller to lodge him and take care
of his baggage, and other equipage; and the traveller on his part,
binds himself to pay his charges.
This law forces innkeepers to take the same care as if they were
expressly paid for watching the goods, and declares that this obligation is an accessory to the commerce in which they are engaged,
and that it is the interest of the public, considering the necessity
under which travellers are to trust inn-keepers, that they be bound
to an exact and faithful care of the things committed to their custody,
and that they be made answerable even for thefts; for otherwise
they might with impunity commit thefts themselves. Domat's
Civil Law, Cushing's edition, vol. 1, Nos. 1172 and 1178.
The common law obliges the innkeeper to keep safely all such
things as his guests deposit within his inn, and Sir William Jones,
in his work on the Law of Bailments, quotes Calye's case, 8 Rep.
33, § 4, where it was held that the obligation exists "although the
guest doth not deliver his goods to the innkeeper to keep." He
further says that the law of this case was recognized in Bennett vs.
.Mellor, 5 Term Rep. 273, where it was determined "that if an
innkeeper refuse to take charge of goods till a future day because
his house is full of parcels, still he is liable to make good the loss
if the owner stop as a guest and the goods be stolen during his stay."
Sir Win. Jones further declares that if the innkeeper fail to provide
honest servants and honest inmates, his negligence is highly culpable, and he ought to answer civilly for their acts, even if they should
rob the guests who are asleep in their chambers. He gives as a
reason, that travellers are obliged to rely almost implicitly on the
good faith of inn-holders who might have frequent opportunities of
associating with ruffians or pilferers, while the injured guest could
seldom or never obtain legal proof of such combinations, or even of
their negligence, if no actual fraud had been committed by them.
He further says, that in all such cases, however, it is competent for
the inn-holder to repel the presumption of his knavery or default,
by proving that he took ordinary care, or that the force which
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occasioned the loss or damage was truly irresistible. Jones on
Bailments, pp. 95, 96.
Story, in his work on Bailments, holds that a delivery of the goods
into the custody of the innkeeper is not necessary, to charge him
with them ; for although the guest doth not deliver them or acquaint
the innkeeper with them, still the latter is bound to pay for them
if they are stolen or taken away; even though the person who stole
them or carried them away is unknown. If the goods are in his
house, they are uider his implied care, whether he knew it or not.
But if the inn-keeper requires of his guest that he should put his
goods in a particular chamber, under lock and key, and that then
he will warrant their safety and otherwise not; and the guest, notwithstanding, leaves them in-an outer court, where they are taken
away, the innkeeper will be discharged. Story also says, that by
the common law, as laid down in Oalye's case, (8th Rep. 82,) the
innkeeper is bound to keep the goods of his guest safe, without
any stealing or purloining, but he adds, that this doctrine is to be
understood with this qualification, that the loss will be deemed prima
facie evidence of negligence, and the innkeeper cannot exonerate
himself but by positive proof that the loss was not by means of any
person for whom he is responsible. It is also held, that the innkeeper may be exonerated in various other ways; as for example,
that the guest has taken upon himself exclusively the custody of his
own goods or has by his own neglect exposed them to peril. Story
on Bailments, §§ 482, 488. The same holds that if the goods be
stolen from the chamber of a guest, the inn-keeper is liable, although
he received no notice that they were placed there. Story on Bailments, § 456; 8 Co. 82; Heyw. N. C. R. 41; 14 John. R. 175; 1
Bell's Com. 469; 1 BI. Com. 480 ; 2 Kent's Com. 458 to 463.
The Civil Code of Louisiana provides that the innkeeper shall be
responsible for the effects brought by travellers although they were
not delivered into his personal care, provided however, they were
delivered to a servant or person in his employment. C. C., art.
2937.
The doctrine of the Code seems to be that the goods must be
delivered to the innkeeper or his agent in order to hold the former

PROFILET vs. HALL ET AL.

responsible. The duties and responsibilities of innkeepers are treated
of under the head of "necessary deposit." C. C. 2935 to 2940;
-Dunn& Yates vs. Branner, 13 An. 454. It has also been held
by us in Pope vs. Hall & KildretL, 14 An., that a guest is not
bound to deposit with the proprietor of a hotel or his agent his
watch, which he may need to know the hour for a particular purpose, or a small sum of money which may be necessary to be used
at any moment for his personal necessities. We see no reason to
differ from this doctrine, and do not think it necessarily conflicts
with the articles of our code on the subject of innkeepers, for they
may be interpreted as referring to those goods which are not essential to the personal convenience of the traveller. Certainly, it could
not be reasonably averred that these articles required the traveller
to deposit at the office of the hotel his trunk containing his wearing
apparel, which he might need at almost any moment. When, then,
a trunk, a watch, or other articles of indispensable personal necessity are stolen, the hotel becomes liable, not under articles 2935 to
2940, but under the tacit acknowledged contract between the keeper
of the hotel and his guest, that he will exercise due diligence to
protect his guest and his property while in his house, unless, indeed,
he should be relieved of this liability by the negligence of his guest
or some other lawful cause.
It is not necessary, in this case, to decide whether an innkeeper
can in any instance, absolve himself from liability, by showing notice by placards posted up in his house. It is sufficient for the
present to say, that even if a guest had been personally notified to
deposit at the office of the hotel or inn, his watch and his personal
effects of an indispensable necessity for the comfort of the traveller,
this would not liberate the innkeeper from responsibility, if they
were not so deposited. The only question that remains for our
consideration, is, whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence to
such a degree as to free the defendants from liability. For as he constitutes himself in part the custodian of such personal effects as he
is not bound to deposit, he is obliged to exercise a certain personal
supervision over them. The hotel keeper cannot be held liable if
he has done all in his power to protect these effects, and if he has
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placed it within the ability of the guest to prevent them from being
stolen. and the guest has neglected to avail himself of such means.
It cannot be expected, at the present day, when hotels are constructed of immense capacity, and capable of holding hundreds of
persons, that the proprietor should be obliged to have a guard at
every door.
If the keeper of the hotel provides with a lock the room where
his guest lodges, which opens inside, and does not open from outside, it is in the poiver of the guest to protect himself, and the hotel
keeper would not be responsible unless it were shown he was guilty
of gross negligence in other respects. For Article 2939 of the
Civil Code declares that "the innkeeper is not responsible for what
is stolen by force and arms, or with exterior breaking open of doors,
or by any other extraordinary violence." The evidence as to the
key of room No. 124 is contradictory.
31r. Soria, a witness for plaintiff testifies that about 9 o'clock at
night, or later, on the 10th of July, 1857, he went with plaintiff to
the office and asked for the key of the room in which the latter had
been previously, and was then lodging ; that the reply from MJ!r.
.Hitclcock, or the person then officiating, was that there was no
key to that room. Witness is not positive as to the name of the
person who gave the reply, but thinks it was Hitchcock.
Mr. iitcheock testifies, that he was at the town of Nahant,
Massachusetts, from June to November, 1857. 1D. L. Mudge testifies, that he was a clerk in the St. Charles Hotel, in July, 1857;
that he and Mr. Ilildreth had charge of the office where the key,
of the rooms were kept when not in the door ; that plaintiff arrived
at the hotel on the 9th of July, at tea-time, and received the keys
of his room, 124; that during the night of the 9th, he had a friend
lodging with him, and had an extra breakfast on the morning of
the 10th, and no complaint was made at the office of want of a key
to plaintiff's room. That if a call had been made for a key, one
would have been furnished in a few moments by the carpenter, upon
an order from the office. He further testifies, that on the evening
of the 10th, plaintiff came in with three or four other gentlemen
about 11 o'clock at night. All of the party seemed to be intoxi-
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cated, and one of them asked if the key was in the box. Witness looked, and seeing that it was not, said he supposed plaintiff
had left it at the room or had it with him.
The party went up stairs, and witness says that he heard nothing
more of them, except that a boy was sent down for liquor, and
witness had to get bar-checks for the boy, and no mention was then
made of the want of the key, and witness heard nothing of any
complaint until next morning.
Upon his cross-examination, he says, he cannot swear positively
he handed plaintiff the key on the night of his arrival, but feels
confident he gave him the key, as there was no complaint of the
want of one until the next night when asked for by Mr. Soria.
Mr. Hitchcock testifies that the carpenter of the hotel keeps
blank keys on hand, and by examining the locks of the doors, can
file the appropriate wards and fix a key in the lock in about ten
minutes. From the very frequent occurrence of the carrying away
by the guests of the keys, as well as carrying them with them all
the time they are not staying at the hotel, instead of depositing
them at the office when they leave their rooms, it is therefore necessary for the carpenter to keep these blank keys. That if plaintiff
had applied for a key, and there had been none in the office for
him, a key would have been fitted in ten minutes, and furnished to
him.
Soria testifies that he told the servant, who went down for the
liquor, to bring up the. key of the room, and that on his return he
said a carpenter was then fitting a key for the room. That the
waiter afterwards brought up a card from Mr. Lacosta, and witness again asked the waiter for a key, who replied that there was
none except the pass-key, which would only lock the door from the
outside. It appears from the testimony of Mudge that no application was made by these two servants for the key. It was certainly
an act of negligence to depend upon the servant, instead of going
to the office to get the key. If plaintiff had done this, he would
not have lost his effects. Bat it appears from the testimony of
Soria that he, plaintiff and some other gentlemen, had gone, on the
night of the 10th of July from the last train of steam-cars of the
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Pontchartrain Railroad to the St. Charles Hotel. They had gone
to the lake by the four or five o'clock train of cars, and during
their stay there had some champagne. Upon their arrival at the
hotel, plaintiff insisted that witness should stay all night with him.
Witness wound up plaintiff's watch because be had put him to bed;
he was partially asleep and was somewhat under the influence of the
liquor he had drank.
Mr. Lewis, a witness of plaintiff, testifies that he was with the
party to the lake, and was at plaintiff's room at the hotel on the
night of the 10th of July; that plaintiff was affected by the liquor
he had drank, and was lying on the bed, but had not been
undressed.
It thus appears that plaintiff was not in a condition to protect
himself, or exercise the most ordinary diligence. Instead of depending upon himself, and taking proper care of his personal effects,
he was obliged to confide in another.
Mr. Soria testified, that he attempted to secure the door in the
best way he could, drew his bed cot against the door as he thought,
and put a chair there, but in the morning when he woke up, he
found that he had not pulled the bed far over enough, and had just
left space enough for the door to be opened, and to admit an ordinary sized man without disturbing witness or the bed. It thus
appears, that the friend of plaintiff did not manifest sufficient care
in seeking to protect him. Witness also states that he laid the
watch of plaintiff on the bureau, and that the ring of plaintiff was
attached to the watch guard, and also his masonic medal. Upon
waking in the morning he saw that the watch, ring, and medal were
gone. It was an act of negligence to leave the watch upon the
bureau. It would have been more prudent and just as easy to have
concealed it under the mattress or in some part of the room. We
are of opinion that if plaintiffihad been sober he might either have
procured a key, or have so concealed his effects that they would not
have been lost. His state of intoxication raises a presumption of
the omission of that care which he was bound to bestow for his own
protection. If he had not been under the effect of liquor he might
have been awakened by the noise of the robber entering the room.

